One of the main contributions of Modern Money Theory (MMT) has been to explain why monetarily sovereign governments have a very flexible policy space that is unconstrained by hard financial limits. Not only can they issue their own currency to pay public debt denominated in their own currency, but they can also easily bypass any self-imposed constraint on budgetary operations. Through a detailed analysis of the institutions and practices surrounding the fiscal and monetary operations of the treasury and central bank of the United States, the eurozone, and Australia, MMT has provided institutional and theoretical insights into the inner workings of economies with monetarily sovereign and nonsovereign governments. The paper shows that the previous theoretical conclusions of MMT can be illustrated by providing further evidence of the interconnectedness of the treasury and the central bank in the United States.
INTRODUCTION
One of the main contributions of Modern Money Theory (MMT) has been to explain why monetarily sovereign governments have a very flexible policy space that is unconstrained by hard financial limits. Not only can they issue their own currency to pay public debt denominated in their own currency, but also any self-imposed constraint on budgetary operations can be bypassed easily. Through a detailed analysis of the institutions and practices surrounding the fiscal and monetary operations of the Treasury and central bank of the U.S., the eurozone, and Australia, MMT has provided institutional and theoretical insights into the inner workings of economies with monetarily sovereign and non-sovereign governments. In terms of theory, MMT argues that taxes and bond offerings are not best conceptualized as funding sources for the Treasury, but rather as reserve draining devices to maintain price and interest-rate stability. As such they are necessary even if a government issues its currency to spend. This theoretical conclusion holds even if the Treasury may be required to tax and issue bond to fund itself.
Another theoretical conclusion is that merging the central bank and the Treasury in a government sector can be done without a loss of generality for monetarily sovereign government. Separating the two adds complexity without adding insights (Mosler 1999; Bell 2000; Bell and Nell 2003; Bell and Wray 2003; Wray 1998 Wray , 2003a Wray , 2003b Wray , 2003c Wray , 2012 Fullwiler 2006 Fullwiler , 2009 Fullwiler , 2011 Fullwiler , 2013 Mitchell and Mosler 2002; Mitchell and Muysken 2008) . This paper shows that the previous theoretical conclusions of MMT can be illustrated by providing further evidence of the interconnectedness of the Treasury and the central bank in the United States. The first part of the paper shows that the early monetary history of the United States provides a direct validation of MMT's theoretical insights. The early history of US monetary policy was a period free of self-imposed constraints; the rest of the paper shows how some of the constraints have been bypassed in order to promote financial stability. The second part of the paper analyzes the role of the Treasury in monetary policy. The third part of the paper focuses on the funding cost and mechanisms of the Treasury.
FISCAL OPERATIONS DURING THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY COLONIES: A TEXTBOOK APPLICATION OF MMT
In the early years of the US monetary system, the fiscal and monetary operations of the government were much simpler. There was no central bank, no primary market, and no debt limit. When a colonial government decided to spend, it issued its own securities to the public with a promise to take them back when tax payments were due. The bills of credit:
were by their terms receivable at the treasury in payment of government dues. They were originally put forth in anticipation of taxes, and provision in the tax levy was made […] for a tax which should furnish the means for the prompt retirement of the bills emitted.
[…] A part only of these notes was destroyed on their return to the treasury. Those remaining in the treasurer's hands were made use of at a later date by the province as a currency […] (Davis 1901, 10, 15, 18, 20) Unconvertible bills were injected when the Treasury spent, and drained when taxes came due. While residents of the colonies were at first skeptical about the value of the bills for economic and political reasons, they rapidly were used as currency and circulated at par:
When the government first offered these bills to creditors in place of coin, they were received with distrust.
[…] their circulating value was at first impaired from twenty to thirty per cent. […] Many people being afraid that the government would in half a year be so overturned as to convert their bills of credit altogether into waste paper, […] . When, however, the complete recognition of the bills was effected by the new government and it was realized that no effort was being made to circulate more of them than was required to meet the immediate necessities of the situation, and further, that no attempt was made to postpone the period when they should be called in, they were accepted with confidence by the entire community […] [and] they continued to circulate at par. (Ibid.) It is straightforward to conclude that the funding capacity of the government was unlimited and that taxes were not a funding mechanism. Tax liabilities were a means to create a demand for the currency, and taxes allowed the draining of bills out of the economy, and validated the expectations of the population about taxes; thereby making the population willing to accept the bills in payment for goods and services.
The governments of the colonies came to appreciate the importance of setting clear expectations regarding future tax collections and in implementing collections. However, they also noted that taxes tended to drain too many bills out of the economic system compared to what was desired by private economic units. This created a dilemma:
The retirement of a large proportion of the circulating medium through annual taxation, regularly produced a stringency from which the legislature sought relief through postponement of the retirements. If the bills were not called in according to the terms of the acts of issue, public faith in them would lessen, if called in there would be a disturbance of the currency. On these points there was a permanent disagreement between the governor and the representatives. (Ibid. 21) Some knowledge of national accounting helps to solve this dilemma because, as long as the private sector desires to have a net accumulation of bills, there is no need to retire all of them through taxation in order to maintain their value; a government deficit is an equilibrium position (Godley and Lavoie 2007) . Private economic agents desired to hold bills for other purposes than the payment of tax liabilities, namely daily expenses, private debt settlements, and precautionary savings. All this is in line with MMT's theoretical conclusion that the equilibrium fiscal position is ultimately determined by the desired net financial accumulation of the non-government sector, and that government can run a deficit because its currency is desired for purposes other than taxation (Wray 2012) .
Today, the US Treasury's fiscal operations and Federal Reserve's monetary operations are constrained in multiple ways. One of the points of MMT is to show that these constraints are self-imposed and do not change the core purpose of taxes and bond offerings; moreover, the Treasury and Federal Reserve can, and do, easily bypass these constraints. MMT concludes that the case of the Massachusetts colonies is complex enough to understand the fiscal and monetary operations of contemporary economies within a monetarily sovereign government.
MONETARY POLICY: THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Balance and Interest Rate Stability
A fiscal deficit lowers the federal funds rate (FFR), which tends to lower other interest rates, all else equal. While this was quite controversial when first noted by MMT proponents, it is now becoming more accepted (Lavoie 2013) . This ought to be the case because this conclusion is not theoretical but rather factual. It comes from the balance sheet accounting of the Federal Reserve (Figure 1 
To simplify, let us assume that all economic transactions involve electronic transfers of funds (no use of Federal Reserve or Treasury currency). As the Treasury spends in the domestic economy (L 2 goes down), the amount of reserves held by banks rises (L 1 goes up) as the Treasury credits the bank accounts of non-bank economic units. As the Treasury taxes (L 2 ) goes up, the amount of reserves held by banks declines (L 1 goes down). If the Treasury spends more than it taxes (i.e. runs a deficit), there is a net increase in L 1 due to an increase in the amount of funds at the Federal Reserve accounts of banks. Surpluses lead to the exact opposite effect--they drain reserves out of the banking system and so reduce the monetary base.
Given that the demand for reserves by banks is highly inelastic, in normal times any TT&Ls were created explicitly for the purpose of smoothing the impact of Treasury fiscal operations on reserves. For example, when the Treasury receives tax payments, it does not immediately transfer them into its TGA but rather keeps the funds in its TT&Ls. This is tremendously helpful for the Federal Reserve when estimating the reserve supply conditions in the federal funds market, and therefore how many OMOs are needed. Bell (2000) , U.S. Treasury (1955) , MacLaury (1977) , Meulendyke (1998) show that the daily coordination between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve is extensive.
Treasury's Monetary Policy during the 2007-2008 Crisis
In usual circumstances, OMOs and TT&L transfers are enough to help stabilize the FFR at its target but these tools were insufficient during the recent financial crisis. In December 2007, the From what the preceding sections have shown, one can conclude that the Treasury has issued securities for other purposes than funding itself. One reason is to provide a means of payment for the country; another is to help the Federal Reserve in its interest-rate stabilization operations; a third one is to help financial institutions meet their capital requirements and to provide a foundation upon which all other securities are valued by providing a proxy for the risk-free rate. MMT argues that these reasons for issuing treasuries are much more relevant in a monetarily sovereign government, because they do not result from a self-imposed constraint.
They respond to a genuine need of the economic system unless an interest rate is paid on reserves (with rates varying with the maturity of the accounts, much like traditional demand and savings deposits), and there is wide access to central bank accounts for financial institutions. 
FUNDING OF THE TREASURY
One conclusion of MMT is that Treasury spending always involves monetary creation as private bank accounts are credited, while taxation involves monetary destruction as bank accounts are debited. The question becomes how the Treasury acquired the funds it has in its TGA; the answer is through taxation and bond offerings. While usually economists stop here, MMT goes one step further and wonders where the funds for taxation and bond purchases came from; the answer is from the Federal Reserve. This must be the case because, leaving aside TT&Ls, taxes and bond offerings drain reserves, so the Federal Reserve had to provide the funds. The logical conclusion then, is that reserve injection has to come before taxes and bond offerings. More broadly, the theoretical insight that MMT draws is that government spending (by the Treasury or the central bank) must come first, i.e. it must come before taxes or bond offerings. Spending is done through monetary creation ex-nihilo in the same way a bank spends by crediting bank accounts; taxes and bond offerings lead to monetary destruction. The bills were accepted at face value for payments of income and profit taxes on a specific date.
In addition, the Treasury allowed banks to pay for the new bills by crediting the TT&Ls. A central goal of allowing TT&Ls crediting was to coordinate with the Federal Reserve in order to maintain interest-rate stability, by preventing drainage of reserves from the sale of treasuries:
The Treasury, on several occasions in the past, has permitted qualified depositary banks to make payment by a credit to the Treasury's account on their own books. The purpose of this provision was to facilitate the marketing of new offerings at times when member bank reserves were subjected to abnormal pressures. Treasury has huge outpayments before tax receipts come in-we used to have securities maturating and interest due the 15th of March before the taxes came in-and in the meantime we had an overdraft, we were busted, and the Federal Reserve used to lend us money at those times (Burgess in U.S. Senate (1957, 897)) In order to bypass the 1935 constraint the Treasury used the following financial trick:
Since under this law the Treasury could not borrow directly from the Federal [Reserve], we would sell to the commercial banks, participation in this overdraft. They would have lots of money, because we just had redeemed some securities and had not collected taxes (Ibid.)
By repaying some maturing securities, the Treasury provided the reserves needed by banks to purchase short-term certificates of indebtedness. The existence of the direct-purchase authority provides us with a margin of safety which permits us to let our cash balance fall to otherwise unacceptably low levels preceding periods of seasonally heavy revenues.
[…] The direct-purchase authority is available to provide an immediate source of funds for temporary financing in the event of a natural emergency on a broader scale. While this has never happened, it is conceivable that financial markets could be disrupted at a time when large amounts of cash had to be raised to maintain governmental functions and meet the emergency. (Altman in U.S. House (1978, 10) )
Chairman Martin provides the Federal Reserve's perspective on this funding facility for the Treasury:
The use of this authority by the Federal Reserve enables the Treasury to avoid creating unnecessary financial strains that would otherwise occur if it had to draw heavily on its accounts especially during periods immediately preceding tax payment dates. Temporary Treasury borrowing at such times, followed by prompt repayment from the proceeds of tax payments, provides a smooth operating mechanism, without the abrupt money market fluctuations that would otherwise occur. (Martin in U.S. House (1962, 12)) One may note again that a central purpose of this funding channel was to protect the federal funds market from adverse impacts associated with the need to replenish the TGA. Figure 5 shows that the Treasury used this funding channel relatively rarely and usually for less than a week at a time. While $5 billion was the maximum limit set by Congress, the Board of Governors had the discretion to set that limit lower. In practice, the maximum amount of "special short-term Treasury certificates" that the Federal Reserve was willing to buy varied between $500 million and $5 billion. The limit was usually set around $1 or $2 billion, but the buying some bonds and notes in the primary market. A major reason why offerings were not successful had to do with the technique of issuance of bonds and notes for which auctioning was not well-established until the 1970s. T-bills were never really a problem as they immediately started to be issued at auction successfully (Garbade 2004 (Garbade , 2008 Hallowell and Williamson 1961) .
Today, the most common way for the government to bypass the financing constraints is through a fourth artifact. Even though the Federal Reserve is not allowed to increase its holding of treasuries by participating in the primary treasuries market, it is indirectly involved in Treasury funding through three channels. First, it finances the primary dealers that participate in 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 Billions One can conclude from the previous points that there is nothing written in stone in terms of fiscal operations. If tomorrow nobody is willing to take treasuries, the Treasury, with or without the help of the Federal Reserve, has the means to bypass that problem if it chooses to use them; it becomes a political issue rather than an economic one. The theoretical implication that MMT draws from this is that one can simplify the economic analysis without a loss of generality by assuming that the Federal Reserve directly funds the Treasury. 
Cost of Public Debt
In a monetarily sovereign government, the government is able to have perfect control over the interest rate it pays on its debt. The government may choose not to use that power but it is a selfimposed constraint; it is a political decision -not an economic constraint. In practice, monetarily sovereign governments choose to go halfway; not totally controlling but also not letting interest rates go out of control. This semi-control comes in three ways. One is through the bidding process in the primary market for treasuries, another is through interest-ratemanagement strategies described in Section 2.2, and a third method is through debt management.
In a treasuries auction, two types of bidding are possible: competitive and noncompetitive bidding. Non-competitive bids means that participants in the primary market for treasuries accept whatever discount rate is determined at the auction. This type of bidding was introduced in 1947 to widen the market for bills among small bidders. For competitive bids, the government set up the auction to get the highest possible price for its securities.
Since November 1998, all Treasury securities have been auctioned according to the uniform-price method.
[…] Previously, most securities had been issued according to the 1914 1918 1922 1926 1930 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 multiple-price method, meaning that securities were awarded at prices corresponding to the yield of each successful competitive bid. In such auctions, bidders must be concerned with the ''winner's curse''-the tendency for a successful bidder to pay a price higher than the value assessed by other auction participants. By mitigating the winner's curse, the uniform-price auction may elicit more aggressive bids, possibly increasing the Treasury's revenue. (Dupont and Sack 1999, 788) As noted earlier, it actually took quite a few decades for the Treasury to figure out the best offering mechanism as oversubscriptions or auction failures were quite common until the 1970s.
Yield-auction instead of price-auction further improved the success of auctions, as did singleprice auctions.
Beyond the auction mechanisms of treasuries, the interest-rate policy of the Federal
Reserve plays a crucial role in determining the level and slope of the yield curve on treasuries through its current and expected FFR. Correlation between FFR and T-bills is almost perfect and correlation between FFR and T-bond rates is very high. The Federal Reserve can also decide to set the entire yield curve. For nine years (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) , the bankers' acceptance rate Finally, the Treasury may improve its control over the cost of its debt by choosing the maturity it wants. If the Treasury wants to closely align its cost to the FFR, it may decide to issue only T-bills. In that case, the cost of the public debt will be under the control of the Federal Reserve. However, the Treasury usually also issues longer maturity securities, partly to fulfill the needs financial-market participants for long-term default-free liquid assets, and partly to avoid frequent refinancing at a higher interest rate if the FFR target goes up. The point is that if cost is the strict consideration, it is easy for the Treasury to be less subject to these costs by shortening the maturity of its outstanding debt. 
Public Debt and Debt Limit
Beyond the prohibition of direct financing by the central bank, another major self-imposed constraint on the budgetary operations of the Treasury is that the U.S. Congress must approve the issuance of additional treasuries if the outstanding amount of treasuries reaches a specific value: the "debt ceiling." Given that Congress usually approves a budget that is in deficit, it must also periodically vote to raise the debt ceiling, but these two votes are done separately. As the current situation in the U.S. shows, if there is no agreement to raise the debt limit, a deficitspending budget cannot be implemented because the Treasury is not allowed to issue more securities to obtain the funds needed to close its budget.
The public debt is the outstanding amount of U.S. Treasury securities (USTS). It includes both marketable securities (mostly bills, notes, bonds and TIPS) and non-marketable securities (United States notes, Gold certificates, U.S. savings bonds, Treasury demand deposits issued to States and Local Governments, and others). The public debt held by the public is the 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 10-Year T-Bonds 3-Month T-Bills 3-Month Prime BAs Discount Window outstanding amount of USTS held by entities outside the U.S. government. These entities include the Federal Reserve System, U.S. states and municipalities, foreign governments, and the private sector.
If one looks more closely at how the public debt is measured, one can quickly note the arbitrary nature of this measure, and that the debt limit can be bypassed easily. For example, coins are not counted as part of the public debt because:
In this context it is critical to realize that the stock of reserves, or money, newly issued by the government is not a debt of the government. The reason is that fiat money is not redeemable, in that holders of money cannot claim repayment in something other than money. Money is therefore properly treated as government equity rather than government debt, which is exactly how treasury coin is currently treated under U.S. accounting conventions (Benes and Kumhof 2012, 6 (Meulendyke 1998, 232, n.15 ).
CONCLUSION
MMT has provided a theoretical framework to think about how monetarily sovereign governments operate and their impacts on the economy. It shows that it is relevant for theoretical purpose to aggregate the central bank and the treasury into a government sector that finances itself through monetary creation. Taxes and bond offerings are central to maintaining the stability of the economic system, but they are not central to the funding of a monetarily sovereign government.
While some critics of MMT have made claims that the consolidation hypothesis lacks descriptiveness because it gets rid of important institutional constraints, one can argue that if it is descriptiveness that one wants one should include all institutional aspects. This means including institutional aspects that allow the Treasury and Federal Reserve/government to bypass the existing self-imposed constraints. This paper has provided some evidence that the self-imposed constraints on the Treasury and Federal Reserve are quite loose, and have been bypassed easily when too constraining or when the stability of the economy was a primary concern. In addition, they do not change the causalities at play, nor the impact on economic variables (impact on interest rates, exchange rates, balance sheets and national income), and so they are not relevant economic issues even though they may be politically relevant. The central bank is in constant contact with the Treasury Department which, among other things, is responsible for the management of the public debt and its various cash accounts. Prior to the existence of the Federal Reserve System, the The central bank and the Treasury must work together to support the monetary and financial systems because they are ultimately two sides of the same coin-the government sector.
This framework of thinking is important because it changes the nature of some economic debates. For example, most of the debates surrounding social security and Medicare are framed in terms of insolvency. Once one accepts that solvency is not an issue-government can always pay-one can reframe the debate in another way (Eisner 1998; Wray 2006) . There is a problem with social security; it is a demographic problem, and not a financial problem. Payments can be made at the time they are due just by crediting bank accounts in a matter of seconds, but the goods and services that are needed may not be available.
